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117 HR 2913 IH: Ukraine Support Act 
 U.S. House of Representatives 
 2025-04-14 
 text/xml 
 EN 
 Pursuant to Title 17 Section 105 of the United States Code, this file is not subject to copyright protection and is in the public domain. 
 
 
 
 I 119th CONGRESS 1st Session H. R. 2913 IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES April 14, 2025 Mr. Meeks (for himself, Mr. Hoyer , Mr. Connolly , Mr. Doggett , and Mr. Keating ) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs , and in addition to the Committees on Transportation and Infrastructure , Intelligence (Permanent Select) , Ways and Means , Rules , the Judiciary , Financial Services , Armed Services , and the Budget , for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned A BILL To authorize support for Ukraine, and for other purposes. 1. Short title; table of contents (a) Short title This Act may be cited as the Ukraine Support Act . (b) Table of contents The table of contents for this Act is as follows: Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. Title I—Diplomacy and Support for Ukraine Sec. 101. Affirming support for Ukraine. Sec. 102. Reaffirming the importance of NATO. Sec. 103. Condemning the kidnapping of Ukrainian children. Sec. 104. Support for Ukraine under title II of the BUILD Act of 2018. Sec. 105. Vessel war risk insurance. Sec. 106. Insurance for Ukraine Initiative. Sec. 107. Codification of a Special Coordinator for Ukrainian Reconstruction. Sec. 108. Support for Radio Free Europe. Sec. 109. Authorizing programs to counter and combat Russian disinformation activities. Sec. 110. Establishment of Ukraine Reconstruction Trust Fund. Sec. 111. United States-European Nuclear Energy Cooperation. Title II—Security assistance Sec. 201. Lend-lease authority. Sec. 202. Direct loans and foreign military financing. Sec. 203. Support for Baltic countries. Sec. 204. Extension of Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative. Sec. 205. Report on allied and partner military contributions. Sec. 206. Report on United States-Ukraine intelligence support and cooperation. Title III—Sanctions and export controls Sec. 301. Sanctions trigger determination. Sec. 302. Imposition of sanctions with respect to Russian financial institutions. Sec. 303. Impositions of sanctions with respect to Russian oil and mining industry. Sec. 304. Imposition of sanctions on certain persons affiliated with or supporting the Government of the Russian Federation. Sec. 305. Crimea tunnel sanctions. Sec. 306. Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant sanctions. Sec. 307. Rosatom sanctions. Sec. 308. Imposition of price cap vessel sanctions. Sec. 309. SWIFT sanctions. Sec. 310. Russian sovereign debt sanctions. Sec. 311. Imposition of sanctions on Russia-North Korea cooperation. Sec. 312. Sanctions for kidnapping Ukrainian children. Sec. 313. Imposition of dual-use export controls. Sec. 314. Duties on the Russian Federation. Sec. 315. Ending Russian oil import loophole. Sec. 316. Taxing capital gains on Russian sovereign assets. Sec. 317. Sanctions described. Sec. 318. Implementation; regulations; penalties. Sec. 319. Exceptions; waiver. Sec. 320. Termination. Sec. 321. Congressional review of Russia sanctions. Sec. 322. Definitions. I Diplomacy and Support for Ukraine 101. Affirming support for Ukraine (a) Findings Congress finds the following: (1) On February 24, 2022, the Russian Federation launched an unprovoked and brutal full-scale invasion of Ukraine, violating Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, subjecting the nation to acts of aggression that have threatened its independence and security. (2) For three years, the people of Ukraine have demonstrated extraordinary resilience, courage, and determination in the face of relentless attacks on their homes, communities, sovereignty, and fundamental freedoms. (3) Since the beginning of the invasion, Russia has engaged in widespread and systematic war crimes, including— (A) deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure, including residential buildings, schools, hospitals, and evacuation corridors; (B) the forced deportation and kidnapping of at least 19,000 Ukrainian children to Russian-controlled territories in an attempt to erase Ukrainian identity; (C) the destruction of Ukraine’s agricultural and energy infrastructure to create humanitarian crises and disrupt global food supply chains; and (D) the use of torture, extrajudicial killings, and mass graves in occupied Ukrainian territories, as documented by the United Nations, the International Criminal Court, and leading human rights organizations. (4) Despite these atrocities, the people of Ukraine remain unyielding, demonstrating that their spirit and commitment to self-determination cannot be extinguished. (5) The Russian Federation, despite its overwhelming use of force, has suffered catastrophic military losses, with estimates exceeding 800,000 casualties, illustrating that President Vladimir Putin’s war of conquest has become both a strategic failure and a humanitarian disaster for Russia. (6) Ukraine, despite facing an adversary with a far larger population, army, and military arsenal, continues to fight courageously for its sovereignty, demonstrating its resilience and determination. (7) Russia’s war has destabilized global security, undermining the principles of sovereignty and nonaggression and emboldening authoritarian regimes seeking to redraw international borders by force. (8) The United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union, and allied nations have demonstrated historic unity in their support for Ukraine, reaffirming their commitment to upholding international law, territorial integrity, and democratic values. (b) Sense of congress It is the sense of Congress that the United States— (1) recognizes that discussions surrounding the future of Ukraine must include Ukraine; (2) condemns in the strongest possible terms the Russian Federation’s ongoing war crimes, its targeted destruction of Ukrainian society, and its blatant violations of international law; (3) reaffirms its commitment to the people of Ukraine and the principles of sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity within internationally recognized borders; (4) urges the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Russian forces from Ukrainian territory, including Crimea and the Donbas, and affirms that any negotiations must be based on Ukraine’s sovereignty, not dictated by Russian ultimatums; (5) demands international institutions take decisive action to ensure the safe return of at least 19,000 kidnapped Ukrainian children, recognizing that their forced deportation is a war crime and an act of genocide under international law; (6) supports the continued prosecution of Vladimir Putin and Russian political and military leaders for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, reinforcing that those who orchestrate such atrocities must be held accountable before the world; and (7) stresses that any sustainable peace deal must be built with Ukraine and our European allies at the table. 102. Reaffirming the importance of NATO (a) Findings Congress finds the following: (1) The United States and its democratic allies and partners face unprecedented international challenges and evolving threats to global security. (2) The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was founded on April 4, 1949, to counter Soviet expansion, prevent further world wars in Europe, and strengthen transatlantic security, and is built on the democratic principles of freedom, security, and national sovereignty. (3) Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty underpins the principle of collective defense and has served as a guiding value of United States foreign policy for over 75 years. (4) The United States commitment to Article 5 enhances deterrence against adversaries such as Russia, China, and Iran that seek to spread their malign influence. (5) The unity of NATO allies strengthens collective security and the stability of democratic states. (6) NATO serves as a bulwark against the proliferation of malign influence, technologies, and destabilizing operations by adversaries. (7) Authoritarian regimes such as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea have increased collaboration in political, economic, and security sectors to undermine democratic principles. (8) In the only invocation of Article 5, NATO allies provided military and intelligence support to the United States following the September 11, 2001, attacks, and many NATO allies incurred significant casualties in Afghanistan. (9) NATO has remained steadfast in its support for Ukraine, with member countries providing military and non-security assistance, strengthening Ukraine’s defense capabilities, and imposing costs on Russia for its illegal invasion. (10) Finland and Sweden made the sovereign decision to accede to NATO following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. (11) NATO continues to address systemic challenges posed by China to Euro-Atlantic interests and security. (12) NATO member states have strengthened their defense and cyber capabilities, including through the Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) program. (b) Sense of congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the United States reaffirms its full and unwavering commitment to NATO; (2) NATO remains vital to United States national security interests and the United States remains fully committed to defending its allies under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty; (3) NATO’s open door policy is essential to European security, and every sovereign state has the right to determine its security arrangements, including Ukraine; (4) the United States remembers and honors the thousands of NATO coalition soldiers who sacrificed their lives following the invocation of Article 5 after the September 11, 2001, attacks; (5) all NATO allies should dedicate at least 2 percent of their gross domestic product to national defense or establish concrete plans to meet their 2 percent obligations by the Washington Summit; and (6) NATO allies must continue cooperation in advanced defense technologies, counterintelligence, and cybersecurity programs to counter evolving threats from adversaries such as Russia, China, and Iran. 103. Condemning the kidnapping of Ukrainian children (a) Findings Congress finds the following: (1) On January 12, 1951, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (commonly known as the Genocide Convention ) entered into force. The Russian Federation is a party to the Convention and is therefore bound by its obligations. (2) On February 24, 2022, the Russian Federation escalated its 8-year occupation of sovereign Ukrainian territory by launching a full-scale, unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. (3) Russian armed forces have committed widespread and systematic atrocities against Ukrainian civilians, including the targeting of civilian infrastructure and protected sites. (4) On March 9, 2022, Russian forces attacked a maternity hospital in Mariupol, Ukraine, resulting in the deaths of 5 individuals and injuries to 17 others, in violation of international humanitarian law. (5) On March 22, 2022, the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that the Russian military had illegally abducted and forcibly transferred 2,389 Ukrainian children from temporarily occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation. (6) On June 2, 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that an estimated 200,000 Ukrainian children had been forcibly transferred to Russia. (7) Article II(e) of the Genocide Convention defines forcibly transferring children of the group to another group as an act of genocide. (8) Maria Lvova-Belova, Children’s Rights Commissioner for the President of Russia, publicly admitted to overseeing the abduction and forced transfer of Ukrainian children and their adoption by Russian families. (9) Ukrainian authorities have stated that many abducted children have living family members in Ukraine but have been separated due to Russia’s renewed invasion. (10) On June 16, 2022, Russian authorities announced that children born in occupied Ukrainian territories after the February 24, 2022, invasion would automatically be deemed Russian citizens, contributing to the erasure of Ukrainian identity. (11) On June 22, 2022, the United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner verified that at least 320 children had been killed as a result of Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine. (12) On July 11, 2022, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres ordered an investigation into the deaths and injuries of Ukrainian children in the context of the conflict. (13) On July 13, 2022, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken called on the Russian Federation to immediately halt its systemic filtration operations in Ukraine , which have resulted in the disappearance, detention, or forcible deportation of between 900,000 and 1,600,000 Ukrainians, including approximately 260,000 children. (b) Sense of congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the abduction and forcible transfer of children and facilitation of illegal adoptions of Ukrainian children by the Russian Federation is contrary to Russia’s obligations under the Genocide Convention and constitute acts of genocide; (2) the Russian Federation is deliberately seeking to wipe out a generation of Ukrainian children, thereby crippling Ukraine’s ability to nurture the next generation of Ukrainian citizens and leaders and to rebuild their country after Russia’s unprovoked war, with the purpose of demolishing Ukraine’s unique language, culture, history, and identity; (3) the Russian Federation’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has significantly increased the risks of children being exposed to human trafficking and exploitation, child labor, gender-based violence, hunger, injury, trauma, deprivation of education and shelter, and death; and (4) the Government of the Russian Federation, under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, bears full responsibility for the wrongful and illegal abduction and forcible transfer of children from Ukraine, and Congress condemns these actions in the strongest terms. 104. Support for Ukraine under title II of the BUILD Act of 2018 Section 1412(c) of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 ( 22 U.S.C. 9612(c) ) is amended— (1) in paragraph (1), by inserting in Ukraine and after the provision of support under title II ; and (2) in paragraph (2)— (A) by striking The Corporation and inserting the following: (A) In general The Corporation ; (B) by striking (A) the President and inserting the following: (i) the President ; (C) by striking (B) such support and inserting the following: (ii) such support ; and (D) by adding at the end the following: (B) Non-applicability to Ukraine The provisions of subparagraph (A) shall not apply with respect to Ukraine. . 105. Vessel war risk insurance (a) Eligibility Notwithstanding section 53902 of title 46, United States Code, for the period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act, and ending 5 years after such date, a covered vessel shall be deemed to be eligible for insurance or reinsurance under chapter 539 of title 46, United States Code, if such vessel is engaged in transportation in waterborne commerce importing cargo to, or exporting cargo from, Ukraine. (b) Expansion of cargo Subparagraphs (B) through (D) of section 53903(a)(3) of title 46, United States Code, shall not apply to cargo imported or exported to or from Ukraine. (c) Definitions In this section: (1) Covered vessel The term covered vessel means a vessel that is owned by a citizen of— (A) a member country of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; (B) Ukraine; or (C) any other country the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, determines, in the interest of national security, shall be considered eligible for insurance or reinsurance under chapter 539 of title 46, United States Code. (2) Owned by a citizen The term owned by a citizen means ownership by an entity that is considered to be a citizen of a country in the same manner as an entity is deemed to be a citizen of the United States under section 50501 of title 46, United States Code. 106. Insurance for Ukraine Initiative (a) Establishment There is established in the Department of State an entity to be known as the Insurance for Ukraine Initiative . (b) Objectives The objectives of the Insurance for Ukraine Initiative are the following: (1) Bolster confidence in Ukraine’s eventual economic recovery from Russia’s full-scale invasion through the provision of war risk insurance. (2) Encourage European allies and partners to finance and invest in Ukraine’s economic recovery, including through the provision of war risk insurance. (3) Promote closer economic integration between Ukraine and other countries in Europe as well as the United States and further Ukraine’s accession to the European Union. (4) Coordinate dialogue and fora for extensive outreach with private sector insurance companies relating to the provision of war risk insurance to Ukraine. (5) Work with Ukraine, international organizations, and Middle Eastern and African allies and partners to ensure the bountiful and affordable shipment of grain and other food commodities from Ukraine. (c) Report Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following 3 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes assessments of— (1) progress towards the achievement of each of the objectives set forth in subsection (b); and (2) legislative proposals that would further the objectives set forth in subsection (b). (d) Diplomatic and political support The Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall seek to provide diplomatic and political support to countries that provide or provide support for war risk insurance for Ukraine, including by using the diplomatic and political influence and expertise of the Department of State to build the capacity of such countries. (e) Appropriate congressional committees defined In this section, the term appropriate congressional committees means— (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. 107. Codification of a Special Coordinator for Ukrainian Reconstruction (a) In general There is established within the Department of State a Special Coordinator for Ukrainian Reconstruction. (b) Selection The Special Coordinator shall be chosen by the Secretary of State and shall report directly to the Secretary. (c) Qualifications The Special Coordinator shall be an individual with— (1) private sector experience; and (2) knowledge of Ukraine and foreign policy pertaining thereto. (d) Duties The Special Coordinator shall assist in— (1) harnessing the tools of different agencies of the United States Government to promote the reconstruction of Ukraine; (2) coordinate cooperation amongst different agencies and bureaus of the United States Government to aid the recovery of Ukraine following its war to protect its sovereignty; and (3) work with the United States Development Finance Corporation to mobilize private capital for the reconstruction of Ukraine. 108. Support for Radio Free Europe (a) Sense of congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty shall be immediately restored to its full capacity and operational position prior to Executive order attempting to shutter the agency; (2) Radio Free Europe provides reliable, uncensored, and accessible news and reporting in Ukraine and other countries where media freedom is restricted; (3) Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty is one of the most critical sources of unrestricted, independent news and reporting for audiences on the periphery of the Russian Federation; (4) the Government of the Russian Federation has engaged in systematic targeting of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reporters inside the Russian Federation, which has negatively impacted the organization’s ability to provide timely, reliable, and accurate news from inside the country; and (5) despite pressure from the Government of the Russian Federation, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s audience continues to grow inside the Russian Federation and surrounding countries. (b) Authorization of appropriations There is authorized to be appropriated $250,000,000 for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty for fiscal year 2026. (c) Authorization of new bureaus Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty may explore opening new bureaus to help expand its ability to reach audiences on the periphery of the Russian Federation. (d) Initiatives To bolster radio free europe/Radio liberty bureaus around russian federation’s periphery To help expand its reach to Russian-speaking audiences and increase its reach to audiences through digital media, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty should— (1) evaluate where Russian disinformation is most deeply pervasive in the Eurasia region; (2) develop strategies to better communicate with predominately Russian-speaking regions; (3) build on efforts to increase capacity and programming to counter disinformation in real time; (4) expand Russian language investigative journalism; (5) improve the technical capacity of the Ukraine bureau; and (6) continue efforts to increase digital news services. (e) Report required Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes— (1) recommendations of locations to open new bureaus to help reach new audiences in the broader Eurasia region; (2) an assessment of current staffing and anticipated staffing needs in order to effectively reach audiences in the broader Eurasia region; and (3) an assessment of the impact of the Government of the Russian Federation closing down Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty within the Russian Federation. (f) Appropriate congressional committees defined In this section, the term appropriate congressional committees means— (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate. 109. Authorizing programs to counter and combat Russian disinformation activities (a) Countering russian influence fund The Secretary of State should use funds available for obligation in the Countering Russian Influence Fund— (1) to prioritize assisting Ukraine to detect and combat disinformation from the Russian Federation and its proxies; and (2) to assist the Government of Ukraine in developing new defense strategies and technologies. (b) Strategy required (1) In general Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a plan for countering and combating disinformation by the Russian Federation and supporting free and independent media in Ukraine that includes— (A) a plan to assist the Government of Ukraine in combating and responding to malign influence operations of the Russian Federation aimed at inflaming tensions and dividing Ukrainian society; (B) an assessment of effective efforts and programs to improve media literacy in Ukraine and recommendations for how the United States can assist in supporting and expanding those programs; (C) a plan to assist the Government of Ukraine improve efforts to detect and remove content originating from Russian troll farms, bots, and other sources aimed at sowing division and disseminating disinformation in Ukraine or targeting Ukrainian audiences; (D) recommendations to increase support for independent media outlets, including Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty; and (E) recommendations to increase support for independent media outlets catering to Russian-speaking populations residing in Russian-occupied Crimea, the Donbas region of Ukraine, and throughout Ukraine. (2) Form The strategy required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex if necessary. 110. Establishment of Ukraine Reconstruction Trust Fund (a) In general Subchapter A of chapter 98 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the following new section: 9512. Ukraine Reconstruction Trust Fund (a) Creation of trust fund There is established in the Treasury of the United States a trust fund to be known as the Ukraine Reconstruction Trust Fund , consisting of such amounts as may be appropriated to such fund as provided in this section. (b) Transfers to trust fund There are hereby appropriated to the Ukraine Reconstruction Trust Fund amounts equivalent to the net revenues received in the Treasury from the taxes imposed under section 892A. (c) Expenditures from trust fund Amounts in the Ukraine Reconstruction Trust Fund shall be available, as provided in appropriations Acts, only to the Secretary of State for purposes of— (1) reconstruction and rebuilding efforts in Ukraine, (2) humanitarian assistance to the people of Ukraine, (3) fostering long-term economic growth and private sector development in Ukraine, and (4) bolstering transparent and accountable governance of the Ukrainian economy. (d) Trust fund not interest-Bearing Section 9602(b) shall not apply to the Ukraine Reconstruction Trust Fund. (e) Requirements under foreign assistance act of 1961 Any assistance made available from amounts in the Ukraine Reconstruction Trust Fund shall be subject to all applicable requirements for the provision of such assistance for the same or similar purpose authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 ( 22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq. ), including requirements under such Act relating to administrative authorities, congressional notifications, and reporting. . (b) Clerical amendment The table of sections for subchapter A of chapter 98 of such Code is amended by adding at the end the following new item: Sec. 9512. Ukraine Reconstruction Trust Fund. . (c) Report (1) In general Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 3 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report detailing the use of any funds made available from the Ukrainian Reconstruction Trust Fund. (2) Appropriate congressional committees defined In this subsection, the term appropriate congressional committees means— (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Finance, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate. 111. United States-European Nuclear Energy Cooperation (a) Findings Congress finds the following: (1) On February 24, 2022, the Russian Federation initiated a full-scale invasion of Ukraine which has severely threatened energy security in the United States, Europe, and around the world. (2) The security of Ukraine’s energy grid has been vital to Ukraine’s success in its defense of its territory and ensuring the Ukrainian government can effectively provide goods and services to Ukrainian citizens. (3) Ukraine has operated four nuclear power plants with 15 reactors, primarily Russian-designed water-water energetic reactor (VVER) reactors. (4) Russia, in its war of aggression against Ukraine, has systematically targeted Ukraine’s energy infrastructure through heavy shelling and targeted attacks, particularly in the winter months when innocent Ukrainian civilians are most vulnerable. (5) Since March 2022, Russian forces have illegally occupied the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station, the largest nuclear power plant in Europe, and Russian forces have surrounded the station with landmines, further threatening regional security. (6) Russian-designed VVER reactors have been built across Europe, including in Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Slovakia, Turkey, and Ukraine. (7) Russia uses its nuclear power plant designs and fuel services to spread malign influence and threaten United States and European energy security. (8) As of 2021, Russia owned about 20 percent of the total uranium conversion infrastructure worldwide and in 2020, had the largest uranium enrichment capacity at close to 46 percent. (b) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) in countries seeking or developing a nuclear power industry, the Department of State should prioritize the utilization of products and services from the United States, and then prioritize products and services from Europe and other allied or partner countries, including Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the Republic of Korea when not directly competing with the United States; (2) the United States and its allies must focus on cooperation, including capacity building and early-stage project support, to expand the nuclear industry in Europe in a way that maintains nonproliferation, security, and safety standards and aligns with international obligations and treaties while combating Russian and Chinese malign influence; and (3) the United States should continue to pursue the Foundational Infrastructure for Responsible Use of Small Modular Reactor Technology program as a means of helping partner countries meet their clean energy needs with scalable, flexible, secure, and safe nuclear power programs. (c) Strategy required The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Energy and the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall develop a strategy to strengthen United States-European nuclear energy cooperation and combat Russian malign influence in the nuclear energy sector in Europe. (d) Elements The strategy required by subsection (c) shall include, at a minimum, the following elements: (1) An overview and assessment of the Secretary of State’s efforts to broaden participation by United States nuclear industry entities in Europe and promote the accessibility and competitiveness of United States, European, and partner technologies and services against Russian and Chinese technologies in Europe. (2) An overview of different nuclear reactor types that are currently deployed or under regulatory review in Europe, including large light-water reactors, small modular light-water reactors, and non-light-water reactors, and— (A) what role, if any, each reactor type could have in reducing Russia’s influence over European energy supply by 2030, 2035, 2040, 2045, and 2050; (B) challenges that each reactor type may face with rapid deployment, including costs, market barriers to first-of-a-kind designs, supply chain constraints, and regulatory requirements; (C) the impacts of each reactor type on maintaining strong nonproliferation standards, including the minimization of weapons-usable nuclear material; and (D) opportunities for the use of United States, European, and partner technologies and services in the deployment or potential deployment of each reactor type. (3) An overview of different fuel cycles that are currently deployed or under consideration in Europe, including use of low enriched uranium, including high assay low enriched uranium, and spent fuel reprocessing, along with an analysis of the implications of each fuel cycle on— (A) reducing and eliminating Russia’s market share in Europe for uranium, conversion, enrichment, and reactor fuel between now and 2030; (B) achieving long-term energy security free of Russian influence; and (C) maintaining strong nonproliferation standards, including the minimization of weapons-usable material as well as high nuclear safety and security standards. (4) An overview of nuclear reactor designs and fuel cycle infrastructure that the United States Government is currently funding the development of, and— (A) the potential, if any, that each of these technologies have to decrease or eliminate Russia’s market share in the United States and Europe for nuclear power reactors, uranium mining and milling, conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, deconversion, and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing in the short-, medium-, and long-term; (B) the impact of these technologies on the minimization of weapons-usable nuclear material, including the use of highly enriched uranium or plutonium fuels; and (C) an assessment of the use cases for each of these designs and fuel cycles. (5) An overview of the United States Government’s diplomatic engagements regarding the nuclear energy sector in Europe. (6) A list of countries in Europe with active nuclear power programs, and— (A) an analysis of each country’s nuclear energy policy; (B) an overview of existing areas of cooperation with regards to nuclear energy between each country and— (i) the United States; (ii) other European and friendly countries; and (iii) adversarial countries including China and Russia; (C) an overview of potential areas for future cooperation between each country and the United States with regards to nuclear energy; and (D) a summary of fuel types used in each country’s nuclear power programs. (7) An overview of Russian and Chinese influence in the European nuclear energy sector. (8) An overview of how the United States Government is working with allies and partners to counter Russian malign influence within the European energy sector to include steps taken to counter Russian influence in the mining and milling, conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication processes as well as in reactor construction. (9) An overview of how the United States Government balances the urgent strategic need for collaboration with allies and partners on countering Russia’s influence on nuclear energy in Europe, with commercial competitiveness issues that may arise between United States companies and companies in Europe, Canada, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. (10) An assessment of Rosatom’s role in Russia’s energy sector, to include an overview of strengths and vulnerabilities of the conglomerate. (e) Submission Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees the strategy required by subsection (c). (f) Form The strategy required by subsection (c) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex, so long as such annex is provided separately from the unclassified strategy. (g) Authorization of appropriations There is authorized to be appropriated $30,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 to support critically needed engagement in Europe consistent with the strategy required by subsection (c) on countering Russian malign influence and with a particular focus on responsible nuclear power program capacity building, early stage nuclear power project support, and countering Russian disinformation campaigns. (h) Definitions In this section: (1) Appropriate congressional committees The term appropriate congressional committees means— (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; (C) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of the Representatives; and (D) the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate. (2) High assay low enriched uranium The term high assay low enriched uranium means uranium enriched so that the concentration of the fissile isotope uranium–235 (U–235) is between 5 percent and 20 percent of the mass of uranium. (3) Low enriched uranium The term low enriched uranium means fuel in which the weight percent of U–235 in the uranium is less than 20 percent. II Security assistance 201. Lend-lease authority Section 2 of the Ukraine Democracy Defense Lend-Lease Act of 2022 ( Public Law 117–118 ; 136 Stat. 1184) is amended— (1) in subsection (a)(1), by striking fiscal years 2022 and 2023 and inserting fiscal years 2022 through 2028 ; (2) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and (3) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new subsection: (c) Report Not later than 90 days after any use of the authority provided by subsection (a), the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to Congress a report that includes— (1) a description of the defense articles loaned or leased to the Government of Ukraine, or to the government of an Eastern European country impacted by the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine, under such authority; and (2) a strategy and timeline for recovery and return of such defense articles. . 202. Direct loans and foreign military financing (a) Direct loans (1) In general Through fiscal year 2026, direct loans under section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act may be made available for Ukraine and North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies, notwithstanding section 23(c)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, gross obligations for the principal amounts of which shall not exceed $8,000,000,000. (2) Other unobligated balances The unobligated balances of amounts made available by any Act making appropriations for the Department of State, foreign operations, and related programs, under the heading International Security Assistance—Funds Appropriated to the President—Foreign Military Financing shall also be made available for the cost of loans and loan guarantees as authorized by this section. (b) Terms and conditions The terms and conditions described in section 2606 of the Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2022 (division N of Public Law 117–103 ) shall apply to amounts made available by this section in the same manner and to the same extent as amounts made available by such section except that subsection (b) of such section shall be applied by striking $4,000,000,000 and inserting $8,000,000,000 . (c) Emergency designation Amounts repurposed pursuant to this section that were previously designated by the Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to a concurrent resolution on the budget or the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, are designated by the Congress as being for an emergency requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A)(i) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985: Provided , That such amounts shall be available only if the President designates such amounts as an emergency requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A)(i). 203. Support for Baltic countries (a) Assistance authorized The Secretary of State shall carry out programs, projects, and activities to build the capacity of the national militaries and border guard forces of Baltic countries, pursuant to the 2024 Bilateral Defense Cooperation Roadmaps for 2024–2028, which provide for the promotion of defense cooperation in integrated air and missile defense, maritime domain awareness, cyber, irregular warfare, participation in international military operations and exercises, infrastructure development, and training . (b) Authorization of appropriations There is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of State, for each of the fiscal years 2026, 2027, and 2028, in addition to amounts already authorized to be appropriated for such purposes to carry out the assistance described in subsection (a)— (1) $30,000,000 for Foreign Military Financing grants authorized under section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act ( 22 U.S.C. 2763 ) for each Baltic country; and (2) $4,000,000 for Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related programs, including as authorized under the Foreign Assistance Act ( 22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq. ) for each Baltic country. (c) Briefing Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall brief the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives regarding— (1) the most pressing security needs of Baltic countries; (2) a plan for the disbursement of funds so obligated; and (3) an analysis of European and other allied country support for Baltic countries. 204. Extension of Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative Section 1250 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 ( Public Law 114–92 ; 129 Stat. 1068) is amended— (1) in subsection (f), by adding at the end the following: (11) For fiscal year 2026, $300,000,000. (12) For fiscal year 2027, $300,000,000. ; and (2) in subsection (h), by striking December 31, 2026 and inserting December 31, 2027 . 205. Report on allied and partner military contributions (a) In general Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report including— (1) a detailed description of all military contributions made or planned by allied and partner countries, disaggregated by country, including details of types and quantities of platforms and systems provided; (2) a description and analysis of military capabilities identified as current Ukrainian operational needs; and (3) a description of United States efforts to meet identified Ukrainian operational needs through transfers of United States arms and military equipment or through support and facilitation of allied and partner transfer of arms and military equipment. (b) Form The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex that is submitted separately from the unclassified portion. (c) Appropriate congressional committees defined In this section, the term appropriate congressional committees means— (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. 206. Report on United States-Ukraine intelligence support and cooperation (a) In general Not later than 120 days after the date of enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, a report including— (1) a detailed description of current United States intelligence support and cooperation to and with Ukrainian military and intelligence services; (2) a description and analysis of the consequences of ceasing such intelligence support and cooperation to Ukraine, including as related to targeting, battlefield effectiveness, early warning capabilities, counterintelligence, and cybersecurity; and (3) a description of United States efforts and initiatives currently underway or planned to increase Ukrainian intelligence, counterintelligence, and cybersecurity capabilities. (b) Form The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in classified form. (c) Appropriate congressional committees defined In this section, the term appropriate congressional committees means— (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. III Sanctions and export controls 301. Sanctions trigger determination Not later than 15 days after the date of enactment of this Act, and at minimum every 90 days thereafter, the President shall make a determination as to whether the Russian Federation or any proxy thereof, is engaged in— (1) conducting a war of aggression against Ukraine; or (2) refusing to sincerely and actually negotiate a peace agreement with Ukraine; or (3) acting in violation of a negotiated peace agreement with Ukraine. 302. Imposition of sanctions with respect to Russian financial institutions (a) Imposition of sanctions (1) In general Upon making an affirmative determination under section 301 and not later than 15 days following such a determination, the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 317 with respect to 3 or more of the following financial institutions: (A) Sberbank. (B) VTB. (C) Gazprombank. (D) VEB.RF. (E) The Russian Direct Investment Fund. (F) Credit Bank of Moscow. (G) Alfa Bank. (H) Rosselkhozbank. (I) FC Bank Otkritie. (J) Promsvyazbank. (K) Sovcombank. (L) Transkapitalbank. (M) The Central Bank of the Russian Federation. (2) Subsidiaries and successor entities The President may impose the sanctions described in section 310(a)(1) with respect to any subsidiary of, or successor entity to, a financial institution specified in paragraph (1). (b) Additional russian financial institutions (1) List required Not later than 30 days after making an affirmative determination under section 301, and every 90 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a list of foreign persons that the President determines— (A) are significant financial institutions owned or operated by the Government of the Russian Federation; and (B) should be sanctioned in the interest of United States national security. (2) Imposition of sanctions Upon the submission of each list required by paragraph (1), the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 310(a)(1) with respect to each foreign person identified on the list. 303. Impositions of sanctions with respect to Russian oil and mining industry Upon making an affirmative determination under section 301 and not later than 15 days following such a determination, the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 317 with respect to all Russian companies operating primarily in any of the following sectors: (1) Oil and gas extraction, refinement, or production. (2) Coal extraction mining, refinement, or production. (3) Mineral extraction and processing. 304. Imposition of sanctions on certain persons affiliated with or supporting the Government of the Russian Federation (a) In general Upon making an affirmative determination under section 301 and not later than 15 days following such a determination, the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 317 with respect to all individuals listed under subsection (b) or included in the additional lists under subsection (c). (b) Officials specified The officials specified in this subsection are the following: (1) The President of the Russian Federation. (2) The Prime Minister of the Russian Federation. (3) The Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation. (4) The Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. (5) The Minister of Transport of the Russian Federation. (6) The Minister of Energy of the Russian Federation. (7) The Minister of Finance of the Russian Federation. (8) The Minister of Energy and Trade of the Russian Federation. (9) The Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. (10) The Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation. (11) The Deputy Minister of Transport of the Russian Federation. (12) The Deputy Energy Minister of the Russian Federation. (13) The Deputy Finance Minister of the Russian Federation. (14) The Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation. (15) The Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. (16) The Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces of the Russian Federation. (17) The Commander-in-Chief of the Aerospace Forces of the Russian Federation. (18) The Commander of the Airborne Forces of the Russian Federation. (19) The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy of the Russian Federation. (20) The Commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces of the Russian Federation. (21) The Commander of the Special Operations Forces of the Russian Federation. (22) The Commander of Logistical Support of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. (c) Additional officials (1) List required Not later than 30 days after making an affirmative determination under section 301 and every 90 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a list of foreign persons that the President determines— (A) are— (i) senior officials of any branch of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation leading any of the operations described in section 302; or (ii) senior officials of the Government of the Russian Federation, including any intelligence agencies or security services of the Russian Federation, with significant roles in planning or implementing such operations; and (B) with respect to which sanctions should be imposed in the interest of the national security of the United States. (2) Imposition of sanctions Upon the submission of each list required by paragraph (1), the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 310 with respect to each foreign person on the list. 305. Crimea tunnel sanctions (a) Findings Congress makes the following findings: (1) In February and March 2014, the Russian Federation invaded the Crimean peninsula and annexed Crimea, internationally recognized as Ukrainian territory. (2) Following its annexation of Crimea, the Russian Federation constructed the Kerch Strait Bridge to connect the Russian mainland with the Crimean peninsula. (3) On February 24, 2022, the Government of the Russian Federation, led by Vladimir Putin, launched an unprovoked, full-scale invasion of Ukraine. (4) The Russian Federation has used Crimea as an integral part of its full scale invasion of Ukraine, including to house Russian troops, store ammunition and weapons, and host the Black Sea Fleet. (5) In October 2023, it was publicly repor

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Confidence: high · Complexity: complex · Model: grok-4.5

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